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Property rights have become the conventional wisdom for the best way to man-
age fishing industries. This debate, once thought closed, has recently been re-
opened. Weitzman (2002) argues that harvest taxes are preferred over individ-
ual transferable quotas (ITQs) under uncertainty about the biological relation 
(environmental uncertainty), because it is possible to reach the desired escape-
ment level of recruits with taxes. Jensen and Vestergaard (2003) argue that in a 
schooling fishery where there is imperfect information about the cost function 
(economic uncertainty), taxes may be preferred over ITQs if the marginal cost 
function is steeper than the marginal benefit function. Thus, these two articles 
present arguments for taxes under environmental and economic uncertainty.  
 
A tax system is also analysed in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002). The point of 
departure for Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) is that within fisheries a moral 
hazard problem arises because individual catches is unobservable. For example, 
an ITQ system creates incentives to exceed the quota because problems with 
illegal landings and discard arise. Thus, Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) analyse 
economic uncertainty and, in addition to solve this uncertainty, the mechanism 
proposed also solves the stock externality problem. In this paper the analysis in 
Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) and Weitzman (2002) is generalised. The paper 
analyses an incentive scheme that can be applied both in the presence of both 
environmental uncertainty (stock uncertainty) and economic uncertainty (imper-
fect information about harvest). 
 
When imperfect information about catches, stock uncertainty and stock exter-
nality problems occurs simultaneous three market failures arise. It is a well-
known general result within economics that if several market failure problems 
interacts several policy instruments must be used to secure a first best optimum. 
Analyses of stock uncertainty and problems with measurement of individual 
catches have been usually accomplished separately within fisheries economics. 
The so called stochastic bioeconomics (see Andersen and Sutinen (1984) for an 
overview) analyse optimal exploitation of the fisheries resource in the light of 
 
7stock uncertainty, while, as mentioned above, Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) 
analyse a stock tax as a solution of problems with imperfect information about 
catches. 
 
As mentioned above the purpose of this paper is to combine a stock tax and a 
tax on self-reported catches to solve the stock externality problem, the problem 
of imperfect information about catches and the stock uncertainty problem.
1 In 
the fisheries economic literature no attempt has, to our knowledge, been made 
to solve several market failures simultaneously and, therefore, this paper is a 
novel contribution to this literature. As mentioned above the mechanism pro-
posed in this paper combines a resource stock tax and a tax on self-reported 
harvest to solve several market failures that arises simultaneously. Thereby, it is 
implicitly argued that taxes are preferred over individual quotas when several 
market failures arise because an ITQ system only is designed to solve the stock 
externality problem.  
 
The result that several market failures can be corrected by the use of several in-
struments generalise to other common pool resources. For example, a private 
owned forest should be harvested such that the present value of net benefits is 
maximised. At least two market failures arise in the case of private owned for-
ests. First, there can be a difference between the private and social discount 
rate. Second, poverty and debt in the developing countries can lead to over-
harvesting of forests. A combination between public ownership and interna-
tional agreements that may involve subsidies from the developed to the unde-
veloped countries may solve these problems. 
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1   The idea to the paper is taken from the work by Xepapadeas (1995) on non-point pollution. 
However, three important differences arise from Xepapadeas (1995). First, Xepapadeas (1995) 
uses a static model, while the model in this paper is dynamic. Second, the tax structure is simu-
lated in this paper in order to obtain a rough indicator for the size of the tax payment. Third, 
Xepapadeas (1995) makes use of monitoring effort in order to secure self reported harvest. In 
this paper it is shown that reporting part of the catches is optimal even without monitoring ef-
fort. The use of incentive schemes based on self-reported harvest to design optimal 
management of fisheries is also a novel thought within the fisheries economic 
literature. A common procedure when managing fisheries is that vessel skippers 
shall keep a logbook to record the quantity of each species caught. The bodies 
responsible for the first marketing shall submit a sales note containing informa-
tion on the quantity of all species landed. Now an important aspect of fisheries 
management is a control policy where cross checking of sales notes and log-
books occurs. However, such a control policy is costly and for this reason it is 
important to construct incentive mechanisms that solve the problem with unob-
servable individual catches. Such a mechanism is constructed in this paper, 
where self-reporting of catches occurs irrespectively of a control policy if fish-
ermen is risk averse with respect to the stock tax payment. In Hansen et al. 
(2003) a mechanism that secures truthful revelation of catches ex ante is con-
structed. However, the approach taken in this paper is different from the ap-
proach in Hansen et al (2003) because the interest is not in truthful revelation. 
Instead the tax on self-reported harvest is based on the ex post chosen report by 
the fisherman in this paper.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the model is presented, while 
section 3 analyses optimal self-reporting by fishermen under stock certainty. 
Section 4 examines stock uncertainty, while some simulations are presented in 
section 5. Some discussion points and a conclusion regarding the suggested tax 
mechanism are presented in section 6. 
2. The  model 
Consider a fishery consisting of n fishermen where a central authority (society) 
imposes a total quota on the industry. Individual catches are assumed to be un-
observable to society. Each year, t, society calculates a target stock size for the 
end of the year, xt+1*. On basis of this target year-end stock size, society calcu-
lates the optimal aggregated catches, ht*. The optimal target year-end stock size 
and the optimal aggregated catches can now be announced.   
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 This set up is similar to the model in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002). However, 
in this paper there is an important difference compared to Jensen and Vester-
gaard (2002). Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) assume that stock size can be 
measured exactly, and therefore a stock tax is studied as a solution to problems 
with imperfect information about catches. In reality, there are measurement 
problems associated with obtaining a reliable measure for stock size, see Anon 
(2002). Therefore, stock size is assumed to be a stochastic variable in this pa-
per. Hence, two market failures (apart from the stock externality problem) are 
analysed in this paper, imperfect information about individual catches and un-
certainty about stock size, and these two market failures interact. When two 
market failures interact, it is in general necessary to use two policy instruments 
to correct these market failures. Based on Xepapadeas (1995), the following in-
struments are analysed in this paper: 
 
a.  A harvest tax rate, τit, per unit of individual, self-reported catches, sit, in 
the period between t and t+1. It is assumed that τit > 0. 
 
b. A stock tax based on the difference between the target year-end stock size 
and the actual stock size at the end of the year, xt+1. The stock tax function 
is specified as a function of the self-reported catches of fisherman i, 
git(sit). The time period between t and t+1 is the same for the stock tax 
function and the self-reporting tax rate. It is assumed that git´(sit) <0 and 
git´´(sit) < 0. It is also assumed that there is a relation between the levels 
of self-reported catches and real catches for fisherman i. This relation is 
specified as sit = fit(hit), where fit´(hit) > 0 and fit´´(sit) > 0. By use of fit(hit) 
the stock tax function may be written as git(sit) = git(fit(hit)) = kit(hit), 
where kit is the stock tax as a function of harvest. The assumptions about 
git(sit) and fit(hit) imply that kit´(hit)< 0 and  kit´´(hit) < 0. 
 
A further assumption is that there is no control policy and, therefore, the fish-
erman can exceed the total quota by any amount that is optimal. Instead of a 
control policy, a resource stock tax and a tax on self-reported harvest is im-
posed and analysed as an alternative to a control policy in this paper. Further-
 
10more, it is assumed that the fisherman receives the same price for all landings 
and a single-species assumption is adopted. A normal assumption in fisheries 
economics is that each individual fisherman disregards resource conservation 
measures corresponding to the stock externality problem; see Clark (1990). 
However, as pointed out by Jensen and Vestergaard (2002), this assumption is 
not reasonable in the presence of a stock tax. According to Jensen and Vester-
gaard (2002), the following function is, therefore, included as a restriction on 
the maximisation problem for fisherman i: 
 
) , h , x ( N x it t it 1 t it h− + =  (1) 
 
where hit is the catch of fisherman i in the period between t and t+1 and h-it is a 
vector of catches for all other fishermen in the same period. Nit(xt, hit, h-it) is an 
expression for how fisherman i perceives that the stock size at time t+1 is influ-
enced by catches and it is assumed that ∂Nit/∂hit < 0. Furthermore, it is assumed 





2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ + it(xt, hit, h-it)  may differ 
from the true resource restriction in societies maximisation problem. As ex-
plained by Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) individual fishermen may have 
wrong perceptions regarding how harvest influence the stock size. Arnason 
(1990) builds a model where fishermen include the true resource restriction in 
their maximisation problem. Thus, the analysis in this paper is more general 
than the analysis in Arnason (1990) because the possibility of wrong percep-
tions by the fisherman is included. 
 
The individual fisherman maximise the profit minus the tax payment in each 
time period and, therefore, the maximisation problem of fisherman i may be 
written as: 
 
it it f , h
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where p is the output price and cit(xt, xt+1 – xt, hit) is the cost function. It is as-
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The maximisation in (2) occurs with respect to the harvest (hit) and self-reported 
catches (sit). However, because there is a relation between the level of the self-
reported harvest and the catches (sit = fit(hit)), maximisation with respect to self 
reported harvest is the same as maximising with respect to fit(sit). Maximisation 
of a function is well-known within economics, see Varian (1992). In (2) phit is 
the revenue, cit(xt, xt+1 – xt, hit) is the production costs and kit(hit)(xt+1*- xt+1) + 
) h ( f it it it τ  is the tax payment. 
 
Substituting (3) into (2) yields the following profit function for fisherman i: 
 
it it f , h
it it it it t it 1 t it it it t it t it t it it ) h ( f )) , h , x ( N * x )( h ( k ) h , x ) , h , x ( N , x ( c ph ( Max τ − − − − − − + − it it h h  (4) 
 
With regard to society, a stochastic version of a management model in Clark 
(1990) is adopted to analyse the welfare optimisation problem. Society maxi-
mises the expected value of future resource rents from t = 0, ……, ∞. Therefore, 
according to Clark (1990) the maximisation problem of society may be written 
as: 
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2   Note that the development in stock size for the period between t and t+1 is included in the cost 
function. This assumption can be deduced from the model in Clark (1990) for total quotas, 
where the integral of the objective function is defined for t=0 to the time when the quota is 
filled. The explanation for this assumption is that changes in stock size between discrete time 
periods will influence cost of harvesting fish. ∑
=
+ = + −
n
1 i
1 t t it t x x ) h ( E ) x ( F  (6) 
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it it it it t it 1 t it it













where F(xt) is the natural growth rate, E(.) is the expectation operator included 
because individual catches is unobservable, and ρ is a discount rate. (5) is an 
expression for the expected present value total resource rent for all fishermen in 
all time periods. The policy instruments for society is the stock tax function, 
kit(hit), and the harvest tax rate, τit. (5) capture that these policy instruments shall 
be fixed such that social optimal individual catches is reached. However, in or-
der to find social optimal catches, the first-order condition with respect to hit 
must be found. In addition, it is only necessary to find the first-order condition 
with respect to kit(hit) because by using the first-order of the fisherman with re-
spect to the self reported harvest, the optimal τi may be found.  Therefore, (5) is 
maximised with respect to hit and kit(hit). In (6) xt+1 – xt is the change in stock 
size between t and t+1 and (6) captures that the change in stock size must equal 
the natural growth rate minus harvest. This equation is known as the resource 
restriction. (7) captures that in selecting hit   and kit, society must accept the 
choice of the fishermen of catches and self reported harvest. By assuming inte-
rior solutions for fit and hit (sit, hit > 0) (7) can be replaced by the first-order 
conditions. With this procedure the maximisation problem may be solved with 
the Lagrange-method.  
 
An important difference between the social and the private (fishermen) opti-
mum can be is seen from comparing (7) and (5). The fishermen maximises 
profit in each period while society selects a profile of optimal harvest for each 
time period at t=0. In other words, fishermen do not take into account the inter-
action that arises between time periods in exploitation of a renewable resource 
like fish.  
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Again (8) is an expression for the present value of resource rents of all fisher-
men in all time periods. By solving (8) subject to (9), the optimal values of 
catches, hit*, the self-report tax rate, τit*, and the stock tax function, kit*(hit), can 
be found. 
3. Full  certainty 
In this section it is shown that with full stock certainty it is optimal for fisher-
man i to report zero catches. In addition, the optimal stock tax function is calcu-
lated. The first-order condition of the maximisation problem for fisherman i 
with respect to fit for the period t is: 
 
0 f , 0 )) x , , h ( N * x )( h ´( k it it t it it 1 t it it ≥ ≤ − − − + τ it h  (10) 
 
In (10) kit´(hit) is included because kit(hit) can be expressed as git(fit(hit)). 
 
By optimal selection of the stock tax function and self-reporting tax rate it can 
be secured that Nit(hit, h-it, xt) = xt+1*. In addition, it is assumed that τit > 0 and, 
therefore, (10) can be reduced to: 
 
140 f , 0 it it = < −τ  (11) 
 
From (11) it is seen that it is optimal for vessels not to reveal any information 
about their catches. The explanation for this result is that without stock uncer-
tainty, the fisherman is indifferent between paying the stock tax and the harvest 
tax. Thus, the fisherman might as well declare fit = 0 and, thereby, avoid the 
self-reporting tax payment. 
 
The first-order condition of the maximisation problem of fisherman i ((4)) with 
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(12) states that the marginal benefits (p) equals the marginal private costs. The 
marginal private costs consists of the marginal production costs (∂cit/∂hit), the 
marginal stock tax costs (kit(hit) ∂Nit/∂hit) and the marginal user costs of the fish 
stock as perceived by the fisherman (∂cit/∂Nit ∂Nit/∂hit).  
 
As mentioned in section 2, (9) can be replaced by (12) in societies maximisa-
tion problem, if an interior solution for hit exists. Furthermore, it is not neces-
sary to take into account the first-order condition for fit, because fit = 0 in opti-
mum. Therefore, the following present value Lagrange function can be set up 
for society: 
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15Noticing that ∂xt+1/∂E(hit) = 1, the first-order conditions of the Lagrange-






























































































































































(17) expresses that the marginal social benefit (p) shall equal the expected mar-
ginal social costs. The expected marginal social costs consists of the expected 
marginal user costs (∑∂cit/∂xt+1) and the expected marginal production costs 











=  (18) 
 
where Q = ∂cit/∂hit + ∂cit/∂Nit ∂Nit/∂hit – E(∂cit/∂hit)  - ∑E(∂cit/∂xt+1) is the mar-
ginal social costs of optimal catches. Q reflects the difference in user costs be-
tween society and the fisherman (∂cit/∂Nit ∂Nit/∂hi is the expected private user 
costs while ∑E(∂cit/∂xt+1) is the marginal social user cost). When the fisherman 
has correct perceptions regarding the resource restriction and society has correct 
 




1 t jt x / c Q . In this case 
the stock tax function is the user cost of the fish stock for society. The user cost 
captures that each individual fisherman does not take into account the effect 
that harvest has on other fishermen. This is usually referred to as the stock ex-
ternality in fisheries economics. 
 
(18) is exactly the stock tax arrived at in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002). The 
tax arrived at in (18) uses the fish stock as tax base. Normally, harvest is the tax 
base but we have shown that self-reported harvest is zero and, in addition, 
catches are not observable. For these reasons, harvest cannot be the tax base in 
this paper. The stock tax proposed in (18) secures optimal individual catches 
because the fishermen pay the full social costs that illegal landings generates 
(the difference in user cost of the fish stock). Therefore, the stock tax can be 
seen as an argument for using taxes instead of ITQs to manage fisheries be-
cause taxes can solve the problem of measuring individual catches. From (18) it 
is clear that it enough for society to fix the stock tax function when there is 
stock certainty if the purpose is to secure optimal individual catches. The reason 
for this result is, naturally enough, that fit = 0. 
4. Uncertainty 
The conclusions in the previous section depend on the assumption that stock 
size is known with certainty. In reality, this assumption is not very realistic be-
cause there is considerable error associated with measuring stock size; see 
Anon (2002). Therefore, the case of stochastic stock size is now analysed. 
Stock size is, due to measurement problems, assumed to be a stochastic variable 
so that  t t t x x ε + = , where εt is a random variable. It is assumed that 




t t t ε σ ε ε = = =
2
t ε σ
, where   is the variance. Now the perceived 
biological reaction function for the fisherman may be expressed as N
2
t ε σ
it(hit, h-it, xt, 
). The expected social optimal stock size is called xt+1*. An assumption re-
garding the risk attitude of the individual fisherman now is necessary and it is 
 
17assumed that fishermen are risk-averters with respect to stock size. Because 
fishermen is risk averters with respect to stock size the following function can 
be formulated with respect to derivations of optimal stock size from actual 
stock size: 
 
)) , x , , h ( N * x (
2
t it it 1 t it t ε σ φ it h− + −  (19) 
 
It is assumed that  it φ (0) = 0,  it φ ´,  it φ ´´ > 0 and  it φ ´´´ > 0. These assumptions re-
flect the risk- aversion of the fisherman with respect to stock size. However, 
(19) is too general to give any quantitative expressions for the self-report tax 
rate and the stock tax function. Therefore, φit is expressed as a second-order ap-
proximation around the point where  . With this second-
order approximation, (19) may be expressed as: 
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(21) is the expression for the risk aversion function with respect to the deviation 
between the optimal and actual stock size that is used in this paper. 
 
Fisherman i is assumed to maximise the expected profit in period t. Because  it φ  
captures the risk aversion of an individual fisherman with respect to stock size, 
(21) can be substituted into (4). This yields the following expected profit func-
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The first-order condition with respect to fit using that if fit(hit) and τit is set cor-
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Because kit´(hit) < 0, τit > 0 and φ´´ > 0, it will be the case that: 
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(24) states that the expected marginal benefit of self-report expressed as mar-





t h k φ
σε − ) shall equal the 
marginal harvest tax payment ( it τ ). From (24) it is clear that it is optimal for 
fisherman i to report a part of the catches even if there is no control policy. In 
other words, the skipper of the vessel will be willing to adjust the harvest so 
that an expected social optimum is achieved and at the same time pay a tax 
based on the self-reported part of the catches. In this way, the vessel reduces its 
stock tax payment if random effects cause xt+1  < x*t+1. Xepapadeas (1995) 
reaches a similar conclusion but for different reasons. In Xepapadaes (1995) 
polluters are also willing to report part of their pollution but this result arises 
because society exercises monitoring effort. In this paper, the fishermen self-
report a part of the harvest even if there is no control policy. The explanation 
for this is that the fishermen prefer a certain self-report tax payment over the 
uncertain stock tax payment if they are risk averse. Thus, risk aversion in itself 
secures that self-reporting of a part of the catches is optimal. 
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 Note that if the fisherman is risk neutral ( it φ ´´ = 0), they would be indifferent 
between the stock tax payment and the harvest tax payment. The result that fit > 
0 is, therefore, driven by the risk-aversion of each individual fisherman. From 
(24), it is also seen that if the measurement error in stock size is large (  is 
large), the self-reported catches will be large, because the first term in (24) in-
creases. The reason for this result is that if the measurement error is large, risk-




Because fit > 0, (24) represents an interior solution and, therefore, (24) is a re-
striction on the maximisation problem for society. Assuming that an interior 
solution for hit also exists, this first-order condition is also a restriction on the 
maximisation problem and from (22) this condition may, noting that  0 ) 0 ( it = φ , 
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(25) states that the marginal revenue shall equal the expected marginal private 
cost for fisherman i. The expected marginal private cost consists of the ex-
pected marginal harvest cost, the expected marginal user cost as perceived by 
the fisherman and the expected marginal stock tax payment.  
 
Using (25) and (24), the following present value Lagrange-function can be set 
up for society: 
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φ φ > 0. In this 






















21(31) states that the marginal social benefit equals the expected marginal social 
costs. The expected marginal social cost consists of the expected marginal pro-
duction costs and the expected marginal user cost as perceived by society. 
 























































φ φ  is the marginal risk 
aversion. The stock tax is, therefore, the expected marginal social cost of opti-
mal catches shared by the marginal risk aversion. It is natural that Q is cor-
rected by the marginal risk aversion is that there is stock uncertainty. 
 










ε − =  (33) 
 
The self-reporting tax rate, thus, consists of three elements: the marginal stock 
tax function, the variance of the uncertain stock size and the second-order de-
rivative of the risk aversion function. The tax structure represented by (32) and 
(33) will secure optimal expected individual catches and this paper can, there-
fore, be seen as an argument for using taxes over ITQs to regulating fisheries 
because a tax system can solve problems with several market failures. 
 
It is also useful to highlight how changes in various variables and functions in-
fluence the stock tax function and self-reporting tax rate. This is done by per-
forming comparative statics and the result of the comparative static analysis is 
 
22sketched in table 1. The expressions for the comparative static results can be 
calculated from (33) and (32) and can be found in appendix A.  
 
Table 1.  The signs of the comparative static expressions 
  Stock tax rate (kit)  Harvest tax rate ( it τ ) 
Beginning of the year stock 
size (xt) 
- - 
End-year stock size( xt+1)  + + 
Individual harvest (hit)  + + 
Risk aversion function 
( it φ (0)) 
- + 
Variance in measuring 
stock size (
t ε σ ) 
- + 
 
From table 1 it is clear that if xt increases, the stock tax function and the self-
reporting tax rate decrease. The explanation for this is that if the stock size in-
creases, optimal catches can be increased and, therefore, the tax payment can be 
decreased. From the comparative static analysis it is also clear that if the target 
year-end stock size increases the stock tax function and the self-report tax rate 
must also be increased (table 1). The reason for this is that optimal catches must 
be reduced if xt+1 shall be increased. In table 1 it is also stated that the stock tax 
function and the self-reporting tax rate is increased if hit is increased. This is 
explained by the fact that an increase in catches implies an increase in the in-
formation problem that arises due to imperfect information about catches. In 
addition, it is from table 1 seen that an increase in the total risk aversion func-
tion ( it φ (0)), implies a decrease in the stock tax function and an increase in the 
self-reporting tax rate. The explanation for this result is that if the total risk 
aversion increase, it becomes more attractive for the fishermen to report a larger 
share of their harvest. From table 1 it is also seen that if the variance increases 
the stock tax rate decreases and the self-report tax rate increases. This conclu-
sion arises because if the variance increases, the measurement error associated 
 
23with the stock increases and, therefore, the fishermen wish to report a larger 
share of their harvest. 
 
A question that arises is if the tax system proposed in this paper is too complex 
to be implemented in practical fisheries management. (32) and (33) require 
knowledge of individual cost functions, individual risk aversion functions and 
individual response to changes in stock size and this is huge information re-
quirements. However, this information can be collected in surveys and, in addi-
tion, other attempts to regulate in an optimal fashion also raise huge informa-
tion requirements. For example, an ITQ system requires that a dynamic optimi-
zation problem is solved and this is a difficult task. If a survey is used a proce-
dure could be to form groups of fishermen with similar characteristics. In addi-
tion, proxies for the necessary data can be used. Information about the stochas-
tic properties of the stock can be found in Anon (1998). Then, the stock tax 
function and the self-reporting tax rate can be calculated and announced to the 
fishermen before a fishing period is started. After the fishing period is ended the 
tax payment is calculated and the tax rates and functions are announced for the 
next period. It can be argued that this system is not more complex that the ra-
tion system used in Denmark; see Jensen (2002). In Denmark a ration is allo-
cated to each individual fisherman each year and this ration varies each year 
because of variations in the EU determined quota. Calculating optimal rations 
also requires substantial information. Thus, the tax system proposed in this pa-
per is not impossible to implement in practical fisheries management and it is, 
therefore, important to highlight whether the taxes is unrealistically high and 




Some simulations for the cod fishery in Kattegat are now presented. Kattegat is 
a small sea east of Denmark with a small population of cod. The motivation is 
to obtain a very rough indicator for the magnitude of the stock tax function and 
the self-reporting tax rate. Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) estimate a pure stock 
tax function for cod in Kattegat. A conclusion in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) is that the stock tax rate function very low compared to the sales price – maxi-
mally 10%. The simulations in this paper extend the empirical analysis in Jen-
sen and Vestergaard (2002), because the focus is on calculating the optimal 
stock tax functions and harvest tax rates in the presence of uncertainty about the 
stock. 
 
As in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) individual tax rates and functions have 
been calculated for six groups of vessels: 
 
- Netters under 20 GT 
- Netters over 20 GT 
- Danish Seiners 
- Trawlers under 50 GT.  
- Trawlers between 50 GT and 199 GT 
- Trawlers over 200 GT 
 
Some assumptions are necessary for the simulations to be conducted. First, it is 
necessary to assume full information about catches for society. Second, it is 
necessary to assume that self reported harvest constitutes a fixed part of the 
harvest each year. Therefore, the functional relation si = αhi is postulated and α 
is set to 0.3. Third, it is assumed that the fishery is always in steady-state. This 
implies that long-run economic yield is maximised and xt+1 = xt = x. If the first-
order conditions for the fisherman is disregarded, the maximisation problem for 
society may be written as   The restriction may 
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i, h-i). Now M(hi, h-i) is an expression for how 
the steady-state stock size is related to catches and ∂M/∂hi is a biological re-
sponse function. The biological response function indicates how the steady-
state stock responds to changes in individual catches. M(hi, h-i) may be substi-
tuted into the objective function to and the first-order condition for fisherman i 
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25to fisherman i, fi and hi is the control variables and the maximisation problem 
may be written as 
) h ( f ))) , , h ( N * x ´´( )) , , h ( N * x ( )( h ( k ) h ), , h ( N ( c ph i i i i i i i
2
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The first-order condition with respect to fi and hi is 
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0 ) 0 ´´( ) h ´( k i i i i i = +τ φ σ ε . On basis of these conditions and the functions presented 
below the tax rates and functions can know be simulated. 
 
The simulation requires knowledge of: 
 
a. M(hi, h-i) 
b. ci(hi, x) 
c.  Ni(hi, h-i) 
d. φi 
e.  σε 
 
All details regarding the simulations are placed in appendix B. With respect to 
M(hi, h-i) a logistic growth function has been estimated, while the cost function 









α + =  (34) 
 
Individual cost functions has been estimated for the average vessel within the 
six groups. 
 
Information about Ni(hi, h-i) is not directly obtainable, but it is assumed that 
Ni(hi, h-i) = DM(hi, h-i) and the simulations is conducted for: 
 
- D = 0.8 
- D = 0.6 
- D = 0.4 
 
26What is new compared to Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) is that an estimate for 
φi and σε is necessary. Information about φi and σε is not directly obtainable 
and, therefore, reasonable functional forms and parameters must be selected. 
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Now the parameters a and b is chosen such that a 50% reduction in the stock 
tax in Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) is obtained. It is, therefore, assumed that a 
= 1,9998 and b = 0.0001. With respect to the variance, this is assumed to be 
small and, therefore, σε = 500 tonnes. 
 
Based on these functions the tax rates and functions can be calculated by insert-
ing actual values for the variables hi, h-i, x and si. By using actual values an es-
timate for what the tax rate and functions, that secures the optimal catches in 
each year given the actual chosen variables, is obtained. In other words, the 
simulations depart from a disequilibrium assumption. 
 
It has already been mentioned that the simulations departs from a function of φi 
that leads to a 50% reduction in the stock tax function in Jensen and Vester-
gaard (2002). Therefore, presentation of harvest tax rates is enough. For the pe-
riod 1991-1997, these are presented in table 2. 
 
 
27Table 2.  Harvest tax rates for the six groups of vessels, DKK per tonnes 
    1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Netters un-
der 20 GT 
D = 0.8  3.03  2.54 3.19 4.29 4.89  2.34  7.87
  D = 0.6  6.07  5.07 6.36 8.57 9.78  4.68  15.71
  D = 0.4  12.10  10.10 12.69 17.10 19.50  9.34  31.35
Netters 
over 20 GT 
D = 0.8  9.02  7.53 9.45 12.74 14.53  6.96  23.36
  D = 0.6  17.95  14.99 18.83 25.37 28.92  13.86  46.51
  D = 0.4  35.57  29.70 37.3 50.27 57.29  27.47  92.15
Danish 
Seiners 
D = 0.8  6.06  5.07 6.36 8.56 9.76  4.68  15.70
  D = 0.6  13.10  10.94 13.74 18.52 21.11  10.11  33.95




D = 0.8  4.55  3.80 4.77 6.43 7.33  3.51  11.78
  D = 0.6  9.08  7.58 9.52 12.83 14.63  7.01  23.51





D = 0.8  3.63  3.03 3.81 5.13 5.85  2.80  9.41
  D = 0.6  7.25  6.05 7.60 10.24 11.68  5.59  18.77




D = 0.8  3.65  3.05 3.83 5.16 5.89  2.82  9.46
  D = 0.6  7.91  6.05 9.08 9.88 9.88  4.73  18.02
  D = 0.4  14.59  12.19 15.30 20.62 23.51  11.26  37.80
 
 
28From table 2 it is seen that the variable harvest tax rate is low compared to the 
sales price. With a sales price between 8,200 and 13,500 DKK per tonnes, the 
harvest tax is maximally 0.5 % of the sales price. The variation in tax rates be-
tween vessel groups is low, which could suggest a uniform tax. However, the 
simulations is based on a very simple assumption about Ni(hi, h-i), so this con-
clusion is not very useful. The harvest tax rate decreases in D. This conclusion 
is not surprising, because an increase in D decreases the market failure. The 
variation in the tax rates over time can be explained by variations in self re-
ported harvest. If the self reported harvest is large, as in the early years, the tax 
rate becomes low. 
 
But how sensible is the conclusion that the harvest tax rate is low to changes in 
the parameters. Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) show that a stock tax function is 
not very sensible to changes in the cost parameters. For this reason only sensi-
bility analysis on φi and σε is performed in this paper. Note that the parameter a 
in φi will not influence the self-reporting tax rate because this parameter is not 
included in φi´´. Therefore, b is varied with +/- 50%. The results are presented 
in table 3. Because of lack of variations in the tax rates between vessel groups 
and years only the results for s = 0.8, Netters under 20 GT and 1997 is pre-
sented. 
 
Table 3.  Sensibility analysis for φi. D = 0.8, Netters under 20 GT, 1997, 
DKK per tonnes 
 Tax  rates 
Main case  7.87 
+ 50%  11.79 
- 50%  5.90 
 
It is seen that the variable tax rate increases with b. The reason for this is that an 
increase in b, increases the risk aversion. Therefore, the fisherman prefers the 
certain self-report tax payment and the tax rate is increased. Despite this fact the 
increase in the tax rate is low even for high increases in b. 
 
29But what about σε? In table 4 the results obtained by varying σε with +/- 50 % 
is reported. 
 
Table 4.  Sensibility analysis for σε., D = 0.8, Netters under 20 GT, 1997, 
DKK per tonnes 
 Tax  rates 
Main case  7.87 
+ 50%  17.69 
- 50%  1.97 
 
Naturally the harvest tax rate increase with an increase in σε. The increase is 
larger than the increase associated with an increase in b. The reason for this is 
that the stock tax function is unaffected by an increase in σε. However, even by 
varying σε with +/- 50%, the self-reporting tax rate still constitutes a very low 
share of the sales price.  
 
To conclude, from table 2, 3 and 4 it is seen that the self-reporting tax rate is 
very low and, therefore, a combination of a stock and harvest tax may be a use-
ful combination of management tools within fisheries. 
6.  Conclusion and discussion 
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In this paper, a stock tax function and a self-reporting tax rate have been com-
bined to solve the stock externality problem, the problems with measurement of 
stock size and the problems with asymmetric information about individual 
catches. The stock and harvest tax system can be designed such that expected 
optimal individual catches is secured. This can not be accomplished within an 
ITQ system. Assume that a total quota is determined and this total quota is dis-
tributed to fishermen as ITQs. Now trade among quotas between fishermen will 
secure that the stock externality problem is solved. In addition, the stock uncer-
tainty problem can be solved by maximising expected present value of resource 
rent. However, the problem of measuring individual catches is not solved be-cause of the well-known problems of compliance with individual quota sys-
tems. Therefore, this paper indirectly argues that taxes may be preferred over 
ITQs to manage fisheries. However, the paper only gives one argument for 
taxes. The issue of the choice between price and quantity regulation are by no 
mean solved with the contribution in this paper because other kinds of uncer-
tainty and asymmetric information can arise within fisheries. For example, Jen-
sen and Vestergaard (2003) show that with uncertainty about the cost function 
nothing definite can be said about the choice between taxes and ITQs for a 
search fishery. It has also been shown that fishermen find it optimal to self-
report a part of their catches if they are risk-averse. The explanation for this re-
sult is that in presence of stock uncertainty risk-averse fishermen will prefer a 
lower uncertain stock tax payment and, thereby, a higher certain harvest tax 
payment.  
 
Two points are worth mentioning. First, the analysis in this paper is based upon 
an assumption that stock size is a random variable. In section 4 the risk aversion 
function was approximated with a second-order approximation around the op-
timal point. If this approximation shall be precise it requires that the random 
variation in stock size (the variance with respect to measuring the uncertain 
stock size) is small, but in reality the random variation in stock size may be 
large; see Anon (2002). However, the second-order approximation is only con-
ducted in order to analyse the tax functions and rates with mathematics. The 
conclusion in the case where the measurement error associated with the stock 
size is large is that fishermen will increase their self-reported harvest if they are 
risk averse. However, this conclusion can only be arrived at formally by con-
ducting an approximation of the risk-aversion function. Second, the analysis 
assumes risk-aversion among fishermen and this assumption can also be dis-
cussed. If vessels are risk-neutral, the fisherman will be indifferent between the 
stock tax payment and the self-reporting tax payment. Therefore, if the fisher-
men are risk-neutral the stock tax alone can secure optimal individual catches. 
 
A criticism of the mechanism proposed in this paper can be that it does not se-
cure budget-balance. This criticism is part of the motivation for the work by 
 
31Xepapadeas (1991), who proposes a random penalty mechanism to solve non-
point pollution problems. Even though it is relevant to discuss this mechanism 
for a renewable resource, a fairly simple solution to the budget-balance problem 
is to pay back the social benefit from falling in line with the optimal catches to 
the industry. In other words, the social benefit from acting optimally is distrib-
uted back to, for example, the fishermen. In this manner, budget-balance can be 
secured. 
 
Furthermore, the information requirements of the proposed tax mechanism 
could be discussed. This point is also part for the motivation for the work by 
Xepapadeas (1991). Within fisheries economics, taxes have traditionally been 
criticised for posing excessive information requirements, see Arnason (1990). 
The information requirements mentioned by Arnason (1990) can be seen from 
the model in this paper, because the user costs enter in the stock tax function 
and the user costs varies over time. However, the tax structure proposed in this 
paper raises even greater information requirements because society must have 
information about the individual risk aversion. This information can, however, 
be obtained in surveys. Furthermore, in practise the information requirements 
are not larger than any necessary information needed when the ambition is to 
regulate in an optimal fashion. 
 
The discussion of information problems are related to the analysis by Cabe and 
Herriges (1992), who mention a problem in connection with non-point pollu-
tion. The tax mechanism proposed within the non-point pollution literature will 
only work if producers perceive they have a significant influence on the ambi-
ent concentration at the damage site. For the model in this paper, this means 
that fishermen must react to the stock tax by taking some account of their effect 
on the stock. If the fishermen do not react in this way, the tax would be ineffec-
tive – the fishermen would interpret it as a lump sum tax, which does not influ-
ence the marginal incentive to catch illegally. Note, however, that the tax will 
work if other criteria are used to determine the quota (e.g. biological or politi-
cal). All that is required is that individual catches are determined. 
 
32Despite these discussion points, combining several policy instruments to the 
solution of several market failure problems within fisheries is an important area 
for future research, because several market failure problems arise simultane-
ously in reality. For example, the optimal combination of instruments to the so-
lution of problems with stock externalities, congestion and asymmetric informa-
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It is assumed that the sign of the partial derivative of Q with respect to a vari-
able is the same as the sign of the partial derivative of the social user cost with 
respect to the same variable. Because of this assumption   since 
, while ∂  since ∂ . Furthermore, because of 
the same fact  . 
0 h / Q it < ∂ ∂
0 x h / c 1 t it it
2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ +
∂
0 x / Q t > ∂
0




x / Q 1 t < ∂ +
 
By differentiating the stock and the self-report tax in the text (32 and 33) the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































Simulation of the tax structure requires information about: 
 
A. M(hi, h-i) 





In this appendix the estimations and assumptions behind the simulations is dis-
cussed. 
 
A. M(hi, h-i) 
An expression for M(hi, h-i) requires information about a growth function. In-
formation about stock size, x, and aggregated catches, H, is reported in table 
B.1. 
 
38Table B.1.  Aggregated catches and stock size for cod in Kattegat 
Year X  H  F(x) 
1971 42372  15732  16985 
1972 43625  17442  18673 
1973 44856  18837  14996 
1974 41015  21880  14667 
1975 33802  15485  19293 
1976 37710  16275  14467 
1977 35902  20119  14479 
1978 30262  13390  14924 
1979 31796  14830  12205 
1980 29171  13509  10209 
1981 25871  15337  9876 
1982 20410  12465  12869 
1983 20814  12828  12873 
1984 20959  11886  9958 
1985 19031  12706  8575 
1986 14900  9096  7306 
1987 13110  11491  7890 
1988 9509  5527  7320 
1989 11302  8590  5879 
1990 8592  5936  6833 
1991 9489  6834  8374 
1992 11029  6271  8160 
1993 12918  7013  12829 
1994 18734  7802  2942 
1995 13874  8165  4322 
1996 10031  6126  10416 
1997 14321  9461  6934 
1998 11794  6835   
 
 
39Data for x is from the 1st of January, while data for H is from the 31
st of De-
cember. It is, therefore, obtained that: 
 
t t 1 t t H x x ) x ( F + − = +  (B1) 
 
The data for F(xt) is also reported in table B.1. 
 
On basis of the data in table B.1, a standard logistic growth function can be es-





1 ( rx ) x ( F − =  (B2) 
where: 
 
  r is the intrinsic growth rate 
  K is the carrying capacity 
 
Non-linear least square is used since the parameters are correlated. The results 
are: 
 
  r = 0.54 (6.96) 
  K = 170,496 (1.19)  (B3) 
 R
2 = 0.51 
 
Note that K is insignificant. The reason for this is that K is large compared to x. 
From (B2) an expression for M(hi, h-i) may be found. The steady-state equation 
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Solving (B4) with respect to x and concentrating on the largest root because 
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Information about Ni(hi,h-i) is not direct obtainable. It is therefore assumed that: 
 
) , h ( DM ) , h ( N i i i i i h h − − =  for D < 1 (B6) 
 
The simulations are conducted for: 
 
  D = 0.8 
  D = 0.6 (B7) 
  D = 0.4 
 
B. ci(hi, x) 
Now to the model for calibrating the cost function. A model from Arnason et al 
(2000) is used. 
 
The profit function for fisherman i is: 
 
) h , x ( c h p ) x , h ( i i i i i i − = π  (B8 
 
where pi is a constant price. 
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Data is only obtainable for five years. Therefore, data for 1997 is used to cali-
brate αi and βi. 
 
There is data for average prices (pi), average costs (si) and individual harvests 
(hi). Therefore, an LP model can look like: 
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where  i h is the ration. The first-order condition of the LP-model is: 
 
0 s p i i i = − − λ  (B13) 
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42Information about average prices and costs is obtained from Anon (1997). Ta-
ble B.2 summarises the calculations of each of the six groups. 
 
























368.4 1424.5  571.7  555.4  710.6  132.4 
Catch cod 
Tonnes 





10.6 13.5 11.2  8.2  8.6  8.9 
Variable cost, 
cod 1000 DKK 
670.8 2327.9 1820.9 1233.5  3059.6  7002.9 
Share of cod  49.74  48.74  25.56  38.49  19.01  1.4 
Variable cost, 
cod, 1000 DKK 
333.7 1134.6  483.6  474.8  581.6  98 
Cost per tonnes 
1000 DKK 
9.6 10.8  9.5  7  7  6.6 
 























1971 58  175  85  112  138  25 
1972 64  194  94  124  152  27 
1973 69  210 101  134  165  29 
1974 81  244 118  156  191  34 
1975 57  172  83  110  135  24 
1976 60  181  88  116  142  25 
1977 74  224 108  144  176  31 
1978 49  149  72  96  117  21 
1979 55  165  80  106  130  23 
1980 50  150  73  96  118  21 
1981 57  171  83  109  134  24 
1982 46  139  67  89  109  19 
1983 47  143  69  92  112  20 
1984 44  132  64  85  104  19 
1985 47  141  68  91  111  20 
1986 34  101  49  65  80  14 
1987 42  128  62  82  100  18 
1988 20  62  30  39  48  9 
1989 32  96  46  61  75  13 
1990 22  66  32  42  52  9 
1991 25  76  37  49  60  11 
1992 23  70  34  45  55  10 
1993 26  78  38  50  61  11 
1994 29  87  42  56  68  12 
1995 30  91  44  58  71  13 
1996 23  68  33  44  54  10 
1997 35  105  51  68  83  15 
























λi  1 2.7 1.7 1.2 1.6 2.3 
 
Inserting information from table B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 yields the cost function 
estimates reported in table B.5. 
 




















αi  150.07 426.46 198.51 195.75 233.29  31.82 
βi  2174.82 918.01  1575.59 869.87 744.62  4305.97 
 
C. φi 
It is not possible to obtain a measure for φi because the function captures the 
risk attitude of the fisherman. In the main text it was mentioned that the follow-
ing assumptions must be fulfilled: 
 
• φi(0) = 0 
• φi´, φi´´ > 0  
• φi´´´ > 0  
 








With respect to σε
2 this parameter is set to 500 tonnes and the self reported har-
vest is taken to be 30% of the actual catches reported in table B.3. 
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